“The first words I learned to read and write were 'we love China, we love the Party'”

Shenglan Zhou, 31, Chinese, is an assistant professor at FCH-Católica and a researcher on propaganda and nationalism in the Chinese education system. She holds a PhD in Communication Sciences from the Catholic University of Portugal. Since 2017, she has been a lecturer in the Master's program in Asian Studies at the Faculty of Human Sciences and a researcher at the Center for Communication and Culture Studies. Her main research interests include propaganda and nationalism in Asian education systems. She has authored publications on the commercialization and mediatization of romantic relationships in contemporary China and nationalist propaganda in the Chinese education system.

Having graduated in Portuguese Studies from a Chinese university, you decided to pursue a doctorate and settle in Portugal. Why?

It was my decision. I wasn't doing very well with the work environment I had in China. I decided to continue studying and came to Lisbon, to the Catholic University, to pursue a master's degree in Asian Studies. I'll complete my PhD in Communication Sciences in 2023. And we'll maintain the master's degree in Asian Studies.

How many years have Portugal been around?

All in all, it's been 11 years.

And what was that experience of working in China like?

In the fourth year of my degree, we had to do an internship. My internship was in the Portuguese department of China Radio International, the foreign propaganda organization. At the time, I didn't really understand it. I thought I was going to write news about China. But on my very first day, I was stopped at the gate by two armed guards. Entry and exit controls were strict. When I started work, the editor gave me some papers to translate from Chinese to Portuguese. They were already complete content. Basically, we had no control over these contents. They were guidelines sent by the Central Propaganda Department (CPD). And our job, apparently, was to translate official news.

Did the Central Propaganda Department then control the entire news flow?

In China, we have state-owned media, agencies, and television stations, but even so-called private media are, at most, 49% privately owned. The state controls everything.

This aims to ensure China has a good reputation abroad. But there's a political scar on China that significantly affected its reputation internationally, after a period of openness: the Tiananmen Square events of June 1989. Was there a concern to restore China's image? Was this achieved?

At the time, there were international sanctions and a dent in its external reputation. But the party [the Chinese Communist Party, CCP] was much more concerned with internal stability. The Chinese leadership recognized the power of young people and students in political events and outlined a program to control mindsets from the earliest school years.

How do they do it nowadays?

Everything counts: from school curricula to leisure time. As early as 1989, the regime launched a Patriotic Education campaign, simultaneously revising programs, starting in elementary school. And new attention was paid to the media, with the creation of patriotic content, aiming to legitimize the CCP as the sole representative of the nation. This implies, for example, a single voice on Chinese history—primarily the history of modern China—and the attempt, from a very early age, to control how children think. In elementary school, the first words I learned to read and write were "we love China, we love the Communist Party." Even school field trips involve sites linked to the Chinese Revolution. During summer vacations, there are propaganda films, particularly propaganda animated films. There are very clear guidelines on how we should think, who our friends are, and who our enemies are. It's a long-term strategy.

Nowadays, it would be difficult to have a new Tiananmen…

[Hesitation] The goal of these government campaigns is to try to nip protest movements in the bud, but during Covid-19, there were youth and student protests. And, as you can see, I'm also a product of this education system, but I don't fully accept what's happening...

But Professor Shenglan Zhou is giving this interview. Is she doing so with complete freedom?

I don't think I'll have any problems. When I go to China, I do so on private trips, to visit my family. Other expats, on the other hand, if they're attending conferences in the country or other types of public activities, are much more... scrutinized. I know of a US-based professor who wrote a book about Covid in China, and when he returned to China, he was stopped at the border and thoroughly interrogated. He was going to participate in a seminar...

Is there special attention paid to the advertising strategy for Portugal?

There are several organizations operating in Portugal. They work to maintain the central government's message. The China Observatory (aligned with the DCP's agenda), for example.

The 2008 Olympic Games were of great importance in China's nationalist affirmation…

They were immensely important. But there were those protests over Tibet, information that also circulated in China... Still, this event marked Chinese nationalism, just like the Winter Olympics in Beijing.

In China, nationality is defined by ethnic criteria. And China has an ethnic unity, centered primarily on the Han ethnic group. But there are different languages throughout the territory. In southern China, Cantonese predominated. Isn't the widespread adoption of Mandarin, even in these regions, being imposed for nationalist reasons?

There's no repression of different dialects or languages. I studied in Macau in 2011, and almost no one spoke Mandarin. I had to speak English... I had a classmate from Zuhai, across the border, who spoke both languages and served as an interpreter. But today, the Macau students we have at Católica speak Mandarin... Speaking another language isn't frowned upon, but when you want to get a job, it's important to speak Mandarin. Other ethnic languages, like Tibetan or Korean, are recognized. There are schools that teach in Tibetan, as are television channels, but somehow, you feel the pressure, and they need to speak Mandarin as well. It's an advantage. Singers, actors, and all the celebrities from various parts of China have to speak Mandarin in addition to their native language.

Meanwhile, there are pockets of people who have been historically repressed. We've already discussed Tibet, but there's also the issue of the Uyghurs...

[Hesitation] That depends on the period we're talking about. People know little about the origins of these disputes. In the Xingjiang region, there are several ethnic groups, not just Uyghurs, but Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans... And there's historical repression. In the 1950s, there was even a repopulation by ethnic Han populations. But suddenly, people are talking about the Uyghur issue or the alleged genocide. It's a complicated issue. There's the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is linked to ISIS and has sponsored terrorist acts. They are people of Turkic origin, with little connection to Han China. And it was a region contaminated by the domino effect of the independence of former Soviet republics. Linked to all this unrest are the poor living conditions of the populations...

And there is the religious question…

Yes, the Constitution allows religion, but the State has a say in the organization of the various religions and China is a secular State.

The Vatican itself had to make a recent agreement with Beijing, giving up several prerogatives in the management of the Chinese Church...

Well, there it is.

But we don't have much news about terrorist attacks in China, perpetrated by these groups...

It's a subject that shouldn't attract the attention of Western media... Suddenly, everyone hears about the Uyghurs, but they don't have all the information. Of course, concentration camps exist, but officially, they're to suppress terrorism. Ultimately, nothing is black and white.

The Chinese symbol chong [a rectangle crossed by a vertical line] is part of the word China and means "center" or "middle." Is it safe to say that people in your country still learn that China is the center of the world?

No! [Laughter.] This is where there is still a certain Eurocentrism…

Precisely… isn’t there, or wasn’t there, a practically symmetrical Sinocentrism?…

Historically, yes. And, for a Chinese, the surrounding peoples, outside the center, were peripheral. And we have a different name for the "barbarians" located at the four cardinal points… [Laughter].

In Cantonese, Westerners are the guai lou… The foreign devils…

I imagine... But I don't know anything about Cantonese... [Laughter.] Now, this Sinocentrism... it's not that it's encouraged in education, but there is, in fact, a narrative (influenced by Professor Zhang Weiwei, an extremely influential advisor to Xi Jinping) in which the Chinese state is a "civilizing state." And in which they speak of "Chinese exceptionalism." And in which they claim that China is a democracy, different from those of the Western world, but superior and more functional. It's a central theme in Chinese propaganda.

During Deng Xiaoping's time, the concept of “one country, two systems” emerged to integrate capitalist practices, or rather, market practices…

This had to do with the colonial legacy and was adapted to the reality of Hong Kong and Macau during the transition of administration to Beijing. And there was the policy of "reform and opening up," which is something else: economic openness. The so-called "socialism with Chinese characteristics."

How is China asserting its propaganda in terms of external projection? What are its main areas of focus? Economy, technology, politics, culture? Technological competition with the West, for example, in the automotive industry?

The economic issue is used to promote Chinese nationalism, especially in the context of competition with the US. During Chinese New Year, the dancing robot show served to demonstrate China's technological superiority in robotics. This extends to drones. And there's a political discourse associated with this: China's narrative is that it uses technology to promote peace, while American technology focuses on promoting war, due to its alleged obsession with military applications.

Explain this better…

Let's look at dancing robots: these machines dance but don't carry weapons. Just as, historically, the Chinese invented fireworks—but not bombs. It's a soft power, on the rise, for the promotion of peace. This is a central narrative in Chinese propaganda.

Even with Taiwan as a thorn in its side? Wouldn't an invasion of Taiwan expose China?

But do you have any information about an imminent war in Taiwan?

I am not…

But it's good to think about this... Taiwan, in this way, will buy weapons from the US...

I spoke in Taiwan to contextualize the new framework for Sino-American relations following Donald Trump's election. Is this a new challenge?

China's communication with Taiwan has a specific department. And there are trade relations. In 2008, there was a successful candidate from Kaohsiung [Southern Taiwan], a candidate from the Nationalist Party, Han Kuo-yu, who has been called the Trump of Taiwan, advocating for closer relations with China. He even briefly served as speaker of the Taiwanese parliament. There are always nuances. In any case, the idea of reunification—always under the Taipei regime, not Beijing, of course—was once more popular in Taiwan.

Does the narrative that the Chinese are making their stand for peace serve to differentiate themselves from Trump?

It's not a policy specifically targeted at the US administration. It's more global. There's a lot of talk about the Chinese threat, and China seeks to deconstruct it. It's one of its main agendas: China doesn't intend to change any country's regime or "export its democracy." Not even in Africa: China doesn't interfere in internal politics. While European and Western aid is subject to certain conditions, which have to do with the nature of the recipient regimes or human rights, China doesn't ask questions. And it seeks to counter this…

China, then, has three vectors of external affirmation: technology, sports (Olympic medals), and economy (trade). Not so much the export of its regime (unlike the former USSR) or cultural expansion. Is that it?

China has some ambitions to expand its cultural influence. But always in terms of soft power. China is in a complicated situation because what people like in the West, in many ways, is different from what people like in China. Still, the rise of TikTok makes it a good tool for influence.

Covid-19 allowed for even greater population control, right?

Right. And that's what stuck. Facial recognition, for example, is widespread, including for payments. Movement tracking apps and camera surveillance have also expanded. And people have normalized this because they feel safer. Citizens aren't aware that these tools can be abused by the state. The mentality is completely different from that in Europe, with Europeans' concerns about privacy and data use.

However, this surveillance not only allows us to control crime, but also political activities considered illegal…

In China, this is not a problem, because, there, no one does anything against the government… I would say that this system would be impossible in Europe.

Is Xi Jinping's leadership unquestionable, then?

There is opposition, but dissenting voices quickly disappear or are silenced. Even journalist certifications are renewed annually, provided there is "good behavior."

And what kind of image does Xi Jinping project? Or what image do you expect the Chinese to have of him?

He's creating an image similar to that of Mao [Zetung]. Many things remind us of Mao. If you walk into any bookstore, you'll immediately find a huge photo of the leader and a book with his thoughts. He's omnipresent, and there's a huge investment in promoting his image, starting from a very young age.

The Party is Xi.

Yes.

He is a very different leader from the previous ones, since Deng.

Yes, and interestingly, Xi Jinping's father was persecuted during Mao's Cultural Revolution. And it's curious how Xi is reclaiming Mao, or some of his practices...

And the importance of Chinese social media to the regime?

They're incredibly important. We don't have access to Western networks, but we do have Chinese ones, which replicate them under a different name, but are controlled by the regime. Foreigners visiting China are almost obliged to use these networks as well. And there's an English-language service, especially on WeChat, China's most popular network.

Isn't the European Union a priority for China today? The EU has also complained about Chinese trade unfairness...

China had defined a strategic triangle: China, the USSR, and the US. Now, after the collapse of the USSR, it has become China, the EU, and the US.

What about Russia? Isn't it in China's sphere of influence?

Not necessarily. I think Russia is closer to North Korea.

So is there a strategic difference between China and North Korea?

Quite a difference, and even more distance, especially in recent years. Without a doubt. With Kim Jong-un and his nuclear tests, which are not approved by Beijing. There is open criticism of Pyongyang, in China, which is no longer censored. North Korea's official media also strongly criticizes China and has even called it "the dog of the United States." Which is quite curious… [Much laughter]. But, at the same time, the military alliance remains.

And Portugal? Is it true that there is a special historical relationship, independent of the EU?

Yes, there are. There are historical affinities, of which Macau is the most visible example. Interestingly, Macau has never experienced the anti-Beijing protests we saw in Hong Kong, but perhaps that's because Macau's people have a better quality of life. Macau is playing an important role in China's relationship with the CPLP countries, with Portugal being a key partner (in China's view). Chinese investment in Portugal is significant and a commitment worth maintaining.